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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

*

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF
SALT LAKE CITY,

*

CASE NO. 950300 - CA

*

PRIORITY NO. 15

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
LOUISE LOPEZ DELGADO,
Defendant/Appellee
*

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code § 78-2a-3(2)(d), and §78-36-11.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly dismiss plaintiff's complaint
for eviction after finding that Appellee Lopez

("Lopez") was

substantially in compliance with her lease agreement?
Whether the evidence presented amounted to compliance with the
agreement is a question of applying the facts to the agreement and
the law and as such, the decision of the trial court should be
given deference by this court. State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112 (Utah
App. 1994).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are controlling in this matter:
Utah Code §78-36-1 et seq.
Utah Code §78-36-3(1)(c)
42 USC §1437d(l)(4)
24 CFR §966.4(1)(3)(i)(A)
24 CFR §966.4(1)(3)(iii)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Housing Authority of Salt Lake City ("Housing") brought this
action under Utah Code §78-36-1 et seq., the Utah unlawful detainer
statute, in an attempt to evict Lopez.

[R. 1-3# 31-33]

Housing

posted a bond pursuant to Utah Code §78-36-8.5. [R. 20-21, 27-30,
34-38] Lopez requested a hearing which was held on April 14, 1995
before the Honorable Stephen Henriod.

[R. 39] Brief testimony was

taken, argument presented and the case was dismissed by the court
by order of April 26, 1995.
that Order.

Housing has appealed from

[R. 43-44]
B.

1.

[R. 40]

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Lopez and Housing entered into a residential lease on or about

September 1, 1992, which was renewed on a yearly basis, most
recently on September 1, 1994. [R. 4-13]
2.

This

tenancy is governed by the federal public housing

statutes and regulations, 42 USC §1437 and 24 CFR §966 et seq.
[R. 57]
3.

Lopez and Housing entered into an agreement in December of

1994 to settle a debt for unpaid rent, maintenance charges and
damages to the premises caused by one of Lopez' children.
2

Lopez

agreed to pay $20.96 each month for twelve months in addition to
her rental amount of
4.

/]

Housing has required all tenants to make their rental payments

into *

ocked box in the Housing office. Tenants are unable to

recei
5.

immedic
On February

receipt
I, 1995 Lopez purchased

amount of $57.00 from Smith's Food King.
Thai, bei! i 11.in i1, Lopez a n d h e r

6.

h.,^; order

^e

[Ex
.

*

•

order in the locked b o x at the housing authority
7.

~

money
•'<->;*

Housing claimed to have not received Lopez' money order. [R.
,1]

8.

On February

^A

1995, Housing served Lopez with a ]4-day

notice to pay rent -r vacate demanding payment
ch
9.

.

r v ent owing, late

-. : ,*• -

. 1 1 .:

]

Housing demanded by letter [Ex. 7, R. 65, 80, 83-84] that

Lopez

trace

authori ty

the

money

order

and

indicated

that

the

housing

woi m II I i I : • t: commence lega

completed. [R.65]
Lopez put a tracer on the money order. [R. 84]
II

Tl le trace ::: £ the moi i€ 3 :::: i: ier s h o w e d I lhit it In

cashed

or recovered. Lopez was willing to pay this money

to

Housing. [R. 80-81]
SUMMARY OF THE ARGDMENT
The trial court correctly ruled that Lopez paid a 1 1 but $-96
of her rent, that she was substantially in compliance with her
lease and was therefore not subject to eviction for nonpayment. The

court's decision to dismiss the eviction action should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DECISION IN THIS CASE MAY BE UPHELD ON ANY PROPER GROUND
This appeal stems from an order entered at a hearing held at

Lopez' request after she was served with a possession bond pursuant
to Utah Code §78-36-8.5.

[R* 40-41, 49-90]

A brief hearing was

held, which included the testimony of two witnesses and argument
from counsel. [R. 40, 49-90] The court then dismissed plaintiff's
complaint, acting pursuant to Utah Code § 78-36-8.5 (4), finding
that all issues between the parties could be adjudicated without
further court proceedings.

The court entered a brief order

dismissing the complaint on April 26, 1995. [R. 40-41] While more
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law would be useful to
this court, the decision of the trial court is amply supported by
a variety of grounds, any one of which may be the basis for
upholding the trial court's decision. Since this court can affiinti
on any reasonable basis, Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah
App. 1992), the lower court's decision should be affirmed.
In State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 115, (Utah App. 1994), this
court quoted State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) in
holding that "[t]rial courts are generally afforded some degree of
discretion in applying a legal standard to a given set of facts"
and "[s]uch discretion allows the trial court to reach one of
several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular
set of facts without risking reversal."
This Court should affirm here either on the ground articulated
4

by tl le trial court, substantial compliance with the lease, or on
the other grounds addressed in this brief, namely

iipLlcii ice by

the plaintiff with federal regulations and state law concerning
notice,

other ground. See Embassy Group v. Hatch, 865

P.2d 1366,
II.

) .

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS THAT LOPEZ WAS
SUBSTANTIALLY IN COMPLIANCE WITH HER LEASE
AGREEMENT
POINT A
THE COURT PROPERLY AVOIDED DECREEING FORFEITURE
OF THE LEASE
The cour 1: a v oi de< I decreeing forfeitu i: e • :>f Lopez 's subsi d I zed

lease by finding that Lopez was in substantial compliance with the
lease agreement.
In U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Company<r 4 J ] I 2ci 86 3 , 869
(Utah 1970), a case where the appellant argued that the court had
erred in not voiding the lease for lessee's non-payment of taxes,
the Supreme C :>i :n :i : t: roi ic] uded that "in equi t] ; [Toll edo] :ii s rel ieved
from any departure here, on the grounds that the defection was so
minor as to invoke the offices of equity, and that at law substantial compliance with the contract, under t. I'M:* din unistances,, wnuld
purge an erstwhile default under a general accepted policy against
forfeiture. . , . ••

(Emphasis added)

The Supreme Court relied on the equitable grounds nf substantial compliance, and general policy grounds against the forfeiture
of a lease, in upholding the lease in U-Beva, and the trial court
used

reasonin

ismissi

5

A policy against forfeiture is well established in Utah
contract law.

In 1946 the Utah Supreme Court stated that "For-

feitures are not favored, and in interpreting an agreement, every
reasonable presumption should be indulged against an intention to
allow a forfeiture." Green v. Palfrevman, 166 P.2d 215, 219 (Utah
1946).

Recent Utah Supreme Court cases apply contract law to

residential leases. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991).
The policy against forfeiture should be applied to residential
leases as well.
Plaintiff is apparently arguing that the court could not,
under any circumstances, rule that a tenant was substantially in
compliance with a lease agreement.

The trial court disagreed, as

did the Utah Supreme Court in U-Beva, and as have courts in other
states, particularly where the eviction action involves tenants
participating in a federal housing program.
In Acorn I, Ltd. v. Jones, No. 426956 (Cal. Mun. Ct., Oakland,
June 25, 1985), 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 660 (No. 39,631, Oct. 1985
(Attached at Addendum 4-1)) the plaintiff, a federally subsidized
multifamily

housing

project, served

demanded payment of $2 unpaid rent.

an eviction

notice

that

The court ruled that a $2

default in rent did not constitute material noncompliance with the
rental agreement and that it would be unfair to evict a tenant for
this amount.
42 USC §1437d(l)(4) provides that housing agencies must
utilize leases which require that the agency may not terminate the
tenancy except for serious or repeated violations of the terms or
6

conditions of the lease u±

:::er good cause.

IUJL

The

lease

between the parties complies with that requirement.
[R. 8 (Paragraph 16)]

The trial court properly found that Lopez

did not commit serious or repeated violations of the lease, and
therefore properly refused in iinteif

i nc h-ar*^ unnrement between

the parties.
This court should follow this authority in holding that the
trial

was

substantially in compliance with her lease should not be evicted,

POINT in

• •' •

-'

•:

LOPEZ IS ENTITLED TO SPECIAL PROTECTION AND
CONSIDERATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN A FEDERALLY
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING PROGRAM
Lopez
is

participai 1 t:s i i i a rei i t:a 1 agreemen t that

federally

subsidized,

governed by

federal regulations,

continuing indefinitely until terminated for good cause.
Supreme
property

tenanl
interest

protected

and

The U.S.

in '.in In .i | mr uyriiui liah a

by the U.S. Constitution

and

has

recognized that such a tenant is entitled to remain in that program
for lif-

'ntil qnnrl canso for evictiv .

. See Swann v.

Gastonia Housing Authority, 502 F.Supp. 362, 365 (1980), citing
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The tenancy is thus
substantially more significant than the usual term fDI: years
Utah.
This situation led the Court of Appeals of Ohio to rule that
equitable interests must be weighed in < : onsi derati oi i nf subs i d i ZCHI
7

housing terminations.

The court stated "[g]enerally, courts, in

balancing equities, will relieve a tenant from the harsh consequences of a forfeiture where the payment of money damages will
adequately compensate the landlord. . . . In the case before us,
"[the tenant] has a substantial equitable interest in maintaining
her fully subsidized housing. .
Wooten,

."

Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v.

597 N.E.2d 554, 561 (Ohio App.1992).

This

significant

difference

between

a

standard

rental

involving two private individuals and one between an individual and
an agency of the federal government should be considered an
important

factor in this case.

The equities, including the

probable difficulty in finding other subsidized housing, a factor
relied upon by the Gorsuch court, should here assist Lopez.

The

trial court's refusal to terminate her tenancy and her subsidy and
forfeit her lease should be upheld.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE FACTS
PRESENTED AMOUNT TO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LEASE AGREEMENT

Whether the facts presented at trial showed that Lopez was
substantially in compliance with her lease is a factual question
and so the decision of the trial court should be given deference
unless shown to be clearly in error.

State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d

112, 115, (Utah App. 1994)
Lopez placed a money order in the amount of $57.00 in the
locked box at Housing's property on February 4, 1995, that is 6
days before the 14 day notice to pay or vacate was served. [R. 79-

8

80] The housing authority could not find the money order and wrote
Lopez a letter on February 17, 1995, asking her to trace it. [R.
65, 80, 83]

As per the letter, the 14-day notice would stay

effective until the Housing Authority received proof of the trace
[R. 64], and the Housing Authority would hold off any legal action
until then. [R. 65] Lopez' trace of the money order revealed that
the money order had not been cashed or recovered. [R. 80-81]
While defendant's payment of $57.00 was $.96 short and she
took two weeks to trace the money order, the trial court ruled that
Lopez was

"substantially

in compliance" with

the

terms

and

conditions of the lease agreement, and while "it would have been
nice if she had done things a little more quickly", she prevailed.
[R. 40-41, 88]
Appellant now states that "While at first blush, 96 cents does
not appear to be a significant sum, the circumstances of this
tenant and this landlord must be considered.

One dollar is a

significant part of this tenant's part of the rent . . . "

[Brief

of Appellants at 15]
To be more precise, appellant is claiming that the amount
unpaid,
considered

1/58 or
a

.01724 of the total payment due should be

"significant"

enough portion

of Lopez' respon-

sibilities under the lease agreement to warrant her eviction and
the forfeiture of the lease.

The trial court could and did find

that all but 1/58th of the total payment was made, no other
significant breaches of the lease were raised,

and it would be

unjust and inequitable for an eviction to proceed based on this
9

minimal amount.

This discretionary ruling by the trial court

should be upheld on appeal.
IV. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY IMPROPERLY
DEMANDED PAYMENT OF OTHER CHARGES
IN THE PAY-RENT-OR-QUIT NOTICE
As previously stated, this court should uphold the decision of
the trial court on any proper basis presented on appeal. Kenyon v.
Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah App. 1992). One such basis would be
that Housing failed to serve a proper notice in this action.
Housing served Lopez an eviction notice demanding payment of rent
owing, late charges and the entire balance owing on the repayment
agreement.
the

14

[R. 14-17] This notice intended to be a combination of

day

notice

required

by

federal

regulation

24

CFR

§966.4(1) (3) (i) (A) and a notice under Utah law, Utah Code §78-363(1)(c).

A combination of state and federal notices is allowed by

24 CFR §966.4(1)(3)(iii).
combination:

However, the notice was an incorrect

it required payment of the balance of the repayment

agreement within 14 days.

The 14 day notice can only be used for

nonpayment of rent. 24 CFR §966 .4(1) (3) (i) The inclusion of other
charges allegedly owed rendered the notice improper under the
federal regulations and the lease agreement.

A 30 day notice

should have been served to demand payment of the other charges in
order to comply with 24 CFR §966.4(1) (3) (i) (C) and paragraph 16 of
the lease agreement.

[R. 8]

In St. Clair County Hous. Auth. V. Turner, No. 89-LM-451 (111.
Cir. Ct., St. Clair County, May 19, 1989), 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
618 (No. 44,680, Aug./Sept 1989), the Housing Authority served a 14
10

day notice demanding both rent and other charges owed.

The court

granted Turner's motion to dismiss because the notice was fatally
defective. It should not have included other charges in the demand
for rent.
Utah law also requires strict compliance with the notice
requirements in the unlawful detainer statute.

Failure to follow

state law notice requirements resulted in

dismissal of the

eviction action in Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979).
While federal regulations govern this tenancy, those regulations
incorporate state law procedures for termination of a tenancy. Our
state law requires strict compliance.

Housing served a notice

demanding more money than was due, and demanded that the extra
amount be paid within a shorter time period than allowed by federal
regulation.
Housing has not strictly complied with applicable law, here
the federal regulations. This improper notice should be considered
another basis for the court's ruling dismissing the eviction
action.
CONCLUSION
This court should uphold the decision of the trial court
dismissing the eviction action against Lopez.
K&y

Respectfully submitted this yJ
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78-36-2. "Forcible d e t a i n e r " defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who
either:
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession
of any real property, whether the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise; or,
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of
the occupants of any real property, unlawfully
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three
days to surrender the same to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the
meaning of this subdivision is one who within
five days preceding such unlawful entry was in
the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such
lands.
1953
78-36-3.

C H A P T E R 36
F O R C I B L E E N T R Y AND DETAINER
Section
78-36-1.
78-36-2.
78-36-3.
78-36-4.
78-36-5.
78-36-6.
78-36-7.
78-36-8.
78-36-8.5.
78-36-9.
78-36-10.
78-36-10.5.
78-36-11.
78-36-12.
78-36-12.3.
78-36-12.6.

"Forcible entry" defined.
"Forcible detainer" defined.
Unlawful detainer by tenant for term
less than life.
Right of tenant of agricultural lands
to hold over.
Remedies available to tenant against
undertenant.
Notice to quit — How served.
Necessary parties defendant.
Allegations permitted in complaint —
Time for appearance — Service of
summons.
Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.
Proof required by plaintiff— Defense.
Judgment for restitution, damages,
and rent — Immediate enforcement
— Treble damages.
Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement — Disposition of personal
property — Hearing.
Time for appeal.
Exclusion of tenant without judicial
process prohibited — Abandoned
premises excepted.
Definitions.
Abandoned premises — Retaking and
rerenting by owner — Liability of
tenant — Personal property of tenant left on premises.

78-36-1. " F o r c i b l e e n t r y " defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into any real
property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, threats or menacme con-

Unlawful detainer by tenant for term
less than life.
( D A tenant of real property, for a term less than
life, is guilty of an unlawful d e t a i n e r
(a) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it,
after the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified
term or period, whether established by express or
implied contract, or whether written or parol,
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic
rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any
month or period, in cases where the owner,
his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to
the end of that month or period, has served
notice requiring him to quit the premises at
the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he
remains in possession of the premises after
the expiration of a notice of not less than five
days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the
surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three
days after service, which notice may be served at
any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease,
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he suffers,
permits, or maintains on or about the premises
any nuisance, including nuisance as defined in
Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit;
or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held,
other than those previously mentioned, and after
notice in writing requinng in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the
surrender of the propertv. served upon him and

78-36-4

JUDICIAL CODE

premises remains uncomplied with for three days
after service. Within three days after the service
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the
term, or other person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a
mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter
16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(1 )(d) are not applicable to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16
only.

1992

78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to
hold over.
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands,
where the tenant has held over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his
term without any demand of possession or notice to
quit by the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the
terms of the lease for another full year, and shall not
be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year;
and the holding over for the 60-day period shall be
taken and construed as a consent on the part of the
tenant to hold for another year.
1981
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against
undertenant.
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the
premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful
detention of the premises underlet to him.
1953
78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served.
The notices required by the preceding sections may
be served:
(1) bv delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or
certified mail addressed to the tenant at his place
of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or
from his usual place of business, by leaving a
copy with a person of suitable age and discretion
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant
at the address of his place of residence or place of
business;
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place of residence, then by
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the
leased property; or
(5) if an order of abatement by eviction of the
nuisance is issued by the court as provided in
Section 78-38-11, when issued, the parties
present shall be on notice that the abatement by
eviction order is issued and immediately effective
or as to any absent party, notice shall be given as
provided in Subsections (1) through (4).
(6) Service upon a subtenant may be made in
the same manner.
1992
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant.
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced,
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shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding,
except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any
proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for
the nonjoinder of any person who might have been
made a party defendant; but when it appears that any
of the parties served with process or appearing in the
proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered
against those parties.
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice as
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was
not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after
the commencement of the action shall be bound by
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action.
13) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant only in an abatement by eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided in
Section 78-38-13.
1992
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint —
Time for appearance — Service of
summons.
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set
forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible
entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim
damages therefor or compensation for the occupation
of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer
charged is after default in the payment of rent, the
complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The
court shall indorse on the summons the number of
days within which the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be less
than three or more than 20 days from the date of
service. The court may authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is
complete one week after publication. Service by mail
is complete three days after mailing. The summons
shall be changed in form to conform to the time of
service as ordered, and shall be served as in other
cases.
1987
78-36-8.5.

Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.

(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint
and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be
in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified
funds, or a property bond executed by two persons
who own real property in the state and who are not
parties to the action. The court shall approve the
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of
costs of suit and damages which may result to the
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted.
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for
the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff
shall notify the defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in the same
manner as service of summons and shall inform the
defendant of all of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a
possession bond under Subsection (1):
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon nonpayment of rent or
utilities, the existing contract shall remain in
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the
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defendant, within three days of the service of the
notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent,
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as provided in the rental
agreement.
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if
he executes and files a counter bond in the form
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified^ funds,
or a property bond executed by two persons who
own real property in the state and who are not
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file
the bond prior to the expiration of three days
from the date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall
approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount of costs of suit and actual damages
that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant
has improperly withheld possession. The court
shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond.
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond.
13) If the defendant does not elect and comply with
a remedy under Subsection l2) within the required
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the property to the plaintiff promptly.
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if the court rules after the hearing
that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the
hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in
possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the parties, the court shall require the
defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues
between the parties can be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits.
1987

78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff — Defense.
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry
or forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may
show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one
whole year continuously next before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is
a bar to the proceedings.
1953
78-36-10. J u d g m e n t for restitution, damages,
a n d rent — I m m e d i a t e enforcement —
Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of
the premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5. If the
nrnroorlmo- ic for nnlnvvful Hptqippr ^ftPT nPSflect Or
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failure to perform any condition or covenant of the
lease or agreement under which the property is held,
or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of
rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction
as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16.
(3> The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may
be issued and enforced immediately.
1994
78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement — Disposition of personal
property — Hearing.
(1) Each order of restitution shall:
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises, remove his personal property, and restore
possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable;
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set
by the court for the defendant to vacate the premises, which shall be three business days following
service of the order, unless the court determines
that a longer or shorter period is appropriate under the circumstances; and
(c) advise the defendant of his right to a hearing to contest the terms of the order of restitution
or the manner of its enforcement.
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form
for the defendant to request a hearing shall be
served personally upon the defendant in accordance with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If personal service is impossible or impracticable, service may be made by mailing a copy of
the order and the form to the defendant's lastknown address and posting a copy of the order
and the form at a conspicuous place on the premises.
(b) The date of service, the name, title, signature, and telephone number of the person serving
the order and the form shall be legibly endorsed
on the copy of the order and the form served on
the defendant.
(c) Within ten days of service, the person serving the order and the form shall file proof of service in accordance with Rule 4(h), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the
order within the time prescribed by the court, a
sheriff or constable at the plaintiffs direction
may enter the premises by force using the least
destructive means possible to remove the defendant
ADDENDUM 1 - 3

(b) Any personal property of the defendant
may be removed from the premises by the sheriff
or constable and transported to a suitable location for safe storage. The sheriff or constable,
with the plaintiffs consent, may delegate responsibility for storage to the plaintiff, who must
store the personal property in a suitable place
and in a reasonable manner.
(c) The personal property removed and stored
shall be inventoried by the sheriff or constable
who shall keep the original inventory and personally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of
the inventory immediately after the personal
property is removed.
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant
within 30 days of removal of personal property
from the premises, the sheriff or constable shall
promptly return all of the defendant's personal
property upon payment of the reasonable costs
incurred for its removal and storage.
(b) The person storing the personal property
may sell the property remaining in storage at a
public sale if:
(i) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of the personal property within 30 days of its removal from the
premises; or
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the removal and storage of the personal property.
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing
the personal property shall mail to the defendant's last-known address a written notice of the
time and place of the sale.
(d) If the defendant is present at the sale, he
may specify the order in which the personal property shall be sold, and only so much personal
property shall be sold as to satisfy the costs of
removal, storage, advertising, and conducting
the sale. The remainder of the personal property,
if any, shall be released to the defendant. If the
defendant is not present at the sale, the proceeds,
after deduction of the costs of removal, storage,
advertising, and conducting the sale shall be paid
to the plaintiff up to the amount of any judgment
the plaintiff obtained against the defendant. Any
surplus shall be paid to the defendant, if the defendant's whereabouts are known. If the defendant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus
shall be disposed of in accordance with Title 78,
Chapter 44, Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.
(e) If the property belonging to a person who is
not a defendant is removed and stored in accordance with this section, that person may claim
the property by delivering a written demand for
its release to the sheriff or constable. If the claimant provides proper identification and evidence of
ownership, the sheriff or constable shall
promptly release the property at no cost to the
claimant,
(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the terms
of the order of restitution or the manner of its enforcement, the defendant or any person claiming to
own stored personal property may file a request for a
hearing. The court shall set the matter for hearing
within ten days from the filing of the request, or as
soon thereafter as practicable, and shall mail notice
of the hearing to the parties.
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms necessary to implement this section.
1994

78-36-11. Time for a p p e a l .
Q) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either
party may, within ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered.
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78-38-9
through 78-38-16, any party may appeal from the
judgment rendered within three days.
1992
78-36-12.

Exclusion of tenant without judicial
p r o c e s s prohibited — Abandoned
premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises.
1981
78-36-12.3. Definitions.
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the premises with intent to
deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state.
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence
other than the presence of the tenant's personal
property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable
evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
1981
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking
and rerenting by owner — Liability of
tenant — Personal property of tenant
left on premises.
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable:
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of
the term; or
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental
value, plus the difference between the fair rental
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary to restore the rental unit to its condition
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not
re-rent the premises.
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and
has left personal property on the premises, the owner
is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling,
store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and
storage costs from the tenant. The owner shall make
reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location
of the personal property; however, if the property has
been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has
made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward
any amount the tenant owes. Any money left over
from the sale of the property shall be handled as specified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this
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(/) Leases; terms and conditions; maintenance; termination
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which—
(1) do not contain unreasonable terms and conditions;
(2) obligate the public housing agency to maintain the project
in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition;
(3) require the public housing agency to give adequate written
notice of termination of the lease which shall not be less than—
(A) a reasonable time, but not to exceed 30 days, when
the health or safety of other tenants or public housing
agency employees is threatened;
(B) 14 days in the case of nonpayment of rent; and
(C) 30 days in any other case;
(4) require that the public housing agency may not terminate
the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of the terms
or conditions of the lease or for other good cause;
(5) provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other
tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such
premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of
the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the
tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy; and
(6) specify that with respect to any notice of eviction or
termination, notwithstanding any State law, a public housing
tenant shall be informed of the opportunity, prior to any hearing
or trial, to examine any relevant documents, records, or regulations directly related to the eviction or termination.
For purposes of paragraph (5), the term "drug-related criminal
activity" means the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, use, or
possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or use, of a
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).

o/ nm n n ^ / /-i \
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(1) Termination of tenancy and eviction—(1) Procedures. The lease shall set
forth the procedures to be followed by
the PHA
^ b v t h e tenant in terminating the lease.
(2) Grounds for termination, (i) The
PHA shall not terminate or refuse to
renew the lease other than for serious
or repeated violation of material terms
of the lease such as failure to make
payments due under the lease or to fulfill the tenant obligations set forth in
{966.4(f) or for other good cause.
(ii) Either of the .following types of
criminal activity by the tenant, any
member of the household, a guest, or
another person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of
tenancy:
(A) Any criminal activity that
threatens the health, safety or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the PHA's public
housing premises by other residents.
(B) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises.
(3) Lease termination notice, (i) The
PHA shall give written notice of lease
termination of:
(A) 14 days in the case of failure to
pay rent;
(B) A reasonable time considering the
seriousness of the situation (but not to
exceed 30 days) when the health or
safety of other residents or PHA employees is threatened; and
(C) 30 days in any other case.
(ii) The notice of lease termination
to the tenant shall state specific
grounds for termination, and shall inform the tenant of the tenant's right to
make such reply as the tenant may
wish. The notice shall also inform the
tenant of the right (pursuant to
§944.4(m)) to examine PHA documents
directly relevant to the termination or
eviction. When the PHA is required to
afford the tenant the opportunity for a
grievance hearing, the notice shall also
inform the tenant of the tenant's right
to request a hearing in accordance with
the PHA's grievance procedure.
(iii) A notice to vacate which is required by State or local law may be
combined with, or run concurrently
with, a notice of lease termination
under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section,
(iv) When the PHA is required to afford the tenant the opportunity for a
hearing under the PHA grievance procedure for a grievance concerning the
lease termination (see § 966.51(a)(1)).
the tenancy shall not terminate (even
if any notice to vacate under State or
local law has expired) until the time
for the tenant to request a grievance
hearing has expired, and (if a hearing
was timely requested by the tenant)
the grievance process has been completed,
(v) When the PHA is not required to
afford the tenant the opportunity for a
hearing under the PHA administrative
grievance procedure for a grievance
concerning the lease termination (see
§966.51(aX2)), and the PHA has decided
to exclude such grievance from the
PHA grievance procedure, the notice of
lease termination under paragraph
(l)(3Xi) of this section shall:
(A) State that the tenant is not entitled to a grievance hearing on the termination.
(B) Specify the judicial eviction procedure to be used by the PHA for evic-
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TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 1985

2
3

—

10:20 O'CLOCK A.M.

-—oOo-—
M S . DeLaVEGA:

I would just like to make, make an oral

4

argument if Mr. Lightfoot doesn*t want to go first.

5

like to request a statement of decision under CCP332.

6

MR. LIGHTFOOT:

I think, your Honor, that isn't

7

appropriate.

g

a half a day or something.

9

I would

I think a trial has to last all day or at least

THE COURT:

No.

She can request it.

Well, first of a l l ,

10

I still agree with your position the $2 rent is at the

JJ

minimus amount of money in light of the fact that the rent for

12

this property is $618 a month, $612 of which has been paid by

13

the Government, that there ought to be some other procedure

14

for collecting this small amount of money before resorting to

15

an eviction proceeding, that under the circumstances of this

]$

case I think that it would be unfair to evict a tenant for

17

this small amount of money.

18

First of all, the landlord had more money than the

19

landlord was entitled to at one point.

He had some of the

20

tenant's money.

21

somewhere.

22

tenant get any credit for that?

23

total circumstances surrounding the way the rent —

24

tenant became behind in the rent as well as the amount for

25

which she was behind that some other procedure other than

26

eviction should have taken place first to give her an

27

opportunity to pay the money, and then if she wasn't —

28

not make up the rent, then I think it would have been appropric

I assumed that it was in a bank account

It might have even been drawing interest.
That —

The

that considering the
the way the

did

LOIS M. LAMBERT. C.S.R.
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, NO. 27BS
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER
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1

to result to t h e eviction proceedings.

2

I'm going to deny your request for eviction.

3

MR. LIGHTFOOT:

4

I just respond t o that?

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. L I G H T F O O T :

And because of that

Before the Court makes the decision, m a y

Okay.
Okay.

Your Honor, on HUD's subsidized

7

property t h e r e f s a multitude of regulations that h a s been

3

laid out to a particular tenant that no conventional tenant

9

is entitled t o .

10

A n d then I think to superimpose any

additional requirements over and above those, that w e c a n f t

]1

really anticipate the —

j2

all these HUD requirements.

13

bunch of those they have to be aware of and do everything w e

14

can to be able to interpret correctly and comply with that

15

are designed for t h e other tenants.

16

go a step beyond that and say w e are going to have to meet

17

some other additional requirement that w e couldn't anticipate

18

having done everything that we need to do as far as both the

19

State L a w is concerned and the Federal Law, I think, would

20

be asking too m u c h .

21

THE COURT:

y o u know, w e can at least anticipate
And as I said there's a whole

[Sic.J

I think then to

W e l l , what would have been wrong with

22

sending her a notice in December stating that "You've got a

23

credit of $5 from past rent that's paid.

24

have ten days t o pay it"?

25

MR. LIGHTFOOT:

26

THE COURT:

27
28

I think, your Honor

Y o u know.

You owe $2 and y o u

—

What would have been wrong with

that?
M R . LIGHTFOOT:

I think that would be fine.

No

L O I S M. L A M B E R T , C.S.R.
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1

problem with it. I think it f s not required.

2

is that you have to give them ten day notice in which you state

3

dn that notice that they have ten days in which to respond/

4

which that notice does state, and advise them.

5

Jones testified at the time I served her, I told her, you know,

6

"Don't worry about it, she's got ten days to come in and pay

7

it." She asked m e something about it. I don f t really recall

8

the conversation, but I know that's what I tell tenants

9

sometime.

10

So that she knew she had ten days.

What HUD says

And as Miss

She said she thought

11

she had ten days other than the weekend.

12

an assumption that is like playing Russian Roulet to make that

13

assumption instead of going ahead and paying it. And in fact

)4

she didn't make the payment until after she got the complaint —

15

summons of complaint.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. LIGHTFOOT:

But it would be on,

I understand.
So the rumor might be that after she got

18

the summons of complaint she went over and paid the rent.

19

According to my reasoning, there's no legal basis for a

20

complaint here.

21

THE COURT:

It's like feeling sorry for, for a tenant.
It's not feeling sorry.

But that defeats the

22

whole purpose of the complaint as I understand the program that

23

tends to subsidise rent for low budgeted people.

24

what her income is like but it seems

25

There's —

26

27
28

I don't know

to be a low budget.

it's no problem for the HUD, Acorn Projects

J sending out a notice before resorting to eviction proceedings.
I don't see how that can be a hardship to you.
And I think that it points out, too, by implementing the
LOIS M. LAMBERT, C.S.R.
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND P£J»0»T£R. MO. 2 7 8 5
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1

eviction procedure without doing that that she later said she

2

misunderstood what the ten-day notice meant whether it was

3

working days versus ten days —

4

times that's even confused by lawyers as to when you have to

5

act within ten days whether you mean ten calendar days versus

6

ten working days.

7

MR. LIGHTFOOT:

8

calendar days. And a lot of

But should that be shifted over, the

blame put on us, your Honor, for her misinterpretation?

9

THE COURT:

No.

I'm not saying it's who's at fault or —

10

but I'm just saying eviction proceedings has to be fair to the

11

tenant and as well as to the landlord.

12

not fair for you to be evicting a tenant over the payment of

13

a $2 bill when you implemented the eviction procedure. I

14

think she has an obligation to pay the rent and it sounds like

15

she was doing okay.

16

there ought to have been some other way to collect the $2

17

other than through serving the notice of eviction.

18
19

20

MR. LIGHTFOOT:
I

for the Plaintiff's

And in this case it's

She was paying in advance even, and that

Your Honor, I think we are going to ask
~

THE COURT: Well, I just stated and that's why I'm telling

21

you on the record why I'm making the decision so that it will

22

serve as the statement of decision.

23

request for restitution of the property —

24
25
26
27
28

MR. LIGHTFOOT:
THE COURT:

That I'm denying your

I see.

Because of the way the background came about

and also the way that you proceeded to collect it.
MR. LIGHTFOOT:

So it would be basically, your Honor, the

mini diminimus because of the rent diminimus; is that right?
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THE COURT:

Well, the way it came about is through her

2

paying rent in advance as well as the way that you attempted

3

to collect it by using the eviction process without first

4

giving her a bill for the additional $2.

5

MR. LIGHTFOOT:

Prior to the ten-day notice?

6

THE COURT:

7

the ten-day notice —

g

didn't pay it the ten-day not be would have brought home to

9

her that this was serious and that this defect was serious and

Prior to the ten-day notice I think is

—

if you'd sent her a bill first and she

10

that you intended to evict her,

11

almost her total rent is being paid by the Government and so I

12

don't see where it's a financial hardship to the Plaintiff in

13

this case.

4 I

MR. LIGHTFOOT:

15

THE COURT:

16

*

of

the

I'm also concerned that

Any other reason, your Honor?

For all those reasons I'm denying restitution

property.

17

MR. LIGHTFOOT:

18

M S . DeLaVEGA^

19

[Proceedings concluded at 11:00 o'clock a.m.]

20 I

Thank you, your Honor,
Thank you f your Honor.

oOo

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

L

___^________^
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